

**Cyber Terrorism: wrong assumptions & true facts + what I hope will never happen.**



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# Agenda



- Introductions
- The real conflict: terminologies
- Cyber Terrorism
  - Definition(s)
  - The confusion
- Cyber Terrorism: the yes and the no
  - Focus: funding (money and underground digital currencies)
- Cybercrime
  - Scenarios and Actors
- Cybercrime, Information Warfare and Cyber Terrorism: the links
- Attack scenarios
  - Finance (mass spear-phishing)
  - Mobile Operators (hacking, SS7/SIGTRAN)
  - Energy Plants (SCADA, ICS)
  - Air Control Systems (ADS-B, ACARS)
  - Railways (GSM-R)
  - Naval ships (AIS)
  - E-Health (hacking)
- The WEF
- Conclusions

# The Speaker

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- Principal, **CyberDefcon Ltd.**
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- Board of Directors, **OWASP** Italian Chapter
- Cultural Attachè. Scientific Committee, **APWG** European Chapter
- Board Member, **AIIC** (Italian Association of Critical Infrastructures)
- **Supporter at various security communities**



# First of all

**No common spelling...**

„Cybersecurity, Cyber-security, Cyber Security ?”

**No common definitions...**

Cybercrime is...?

**No clear actors...**

Cybercrime/war/terrorism ?

**No common components?...**

# The conflict on terminologies /1

- Over the last days we've listened to **different interpretations** of «Cyber Terrorism».
- The phrase «**Cyber Terror**» appeared for the first time in the **mid-eighties**.
  - **Barry C. Collin**, a senior research fellow of the **Institute for Security and Intelligence in California**, defined Cyber Terror at that time as: the convergence of cybernetics and terrorism»: an elegant and simple definition.
  - It **wasn't enough** tough, to make clear distinction with terms like **Cybercrime**, **Cyber Activism** (Hacktivism) and **Cyber Extremism**.
- Back in **1997**, **Mark Pollit from the FBI** defined Cyber Terrorism as:  
*The premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (FBI, 1997).*
- In **2004**, **FBI** redefined the term of Cyber Terrorism as (Lourdeau, 2004):  
*A criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services, where the intended purpose is to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda (FBI, 2004).*

# The conflict on terminologies /2

- In **2002**, the **US Center for Strategic and International Studies** defined Cyber Terrorism as:

*The use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructure (such as energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population (Lewis, 2002).*

- The **UK Terrorism Act** goes further:

*The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.*


*It involves or causes:*

- *serious violence against a person;*
- *serious damage to a property;*
- *a threat to a person's life;*
- *a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or*
- *serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system (UK Terrorism Act 2000).*

# The conflict on terminologies /3

- No commonly agreed definition of *terrorism* (!)
- **International** Acts and treaties;
  - UN Resolutions 1368&1373
  - NAC decision dated 03 Oct 2001
  - EU Counter-Terrorism strategy
- Terrorist Organizations **lists** (even if... see later)
- International Law Authorities: **Enough tools** for combatting terrorism?
- Political will of **all nations**

# Dimension of modern, global terrorism



# Don't miss different perspectives!

- Has a **Cyberterrorism attack** already happened?
  - **NO** (thanks God!)
- As of today, terrorist organizations make use of the Internet in order to:
  - **Publicity/Advertising and Propaganda**
  - Data Mining
  - Recruiting and Mobilization
  - **Fundraising**
  - Networking / Sharing Information
  - Training
  - Planning and Coordination
  - Claiming attack's responsibility, showing «what they have been able to do»
- The point is that they may make much worse, if they would know **how to make it**.
  - We'll speak about this later.

# Making propaganda

- Terrorism / Govt Intelligence (8)
- . Specific Terrorist Groups (5)
- Abu Sayyaf
- Afnad Misr/Soldiers of Egypt
- Afnad al-Sham
- Al Qaeda/al-Qaida /Al Queda / AQIM/AQAP/AQSL
- Al-Murabitoon
- Al-Qassam / Al-Qassam
- Al-Shabaab / Al Shabaab / al-Shabab
- Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
- As-Sahab
- Boko Haram
- Cyber Caliphate / CyberCaliphate
- Hezbollah
- Hizb-ut-Tahrir / HTA (Hizb ut-tahrir America)
- Houthi militants / Houthi group / Houthi rebel
- IS /ISIS/Islamic State/ISIL/Takfiris/AQI/ Daish/ Daesh
- Jabhat al-Nusra
- Jaysh al-Islam
- Jund al-Khilafa
- Khorasan
- Specific Terrorist Groups - Various
- Tehreek-e-Taliban / Taliban
- . Inspire / Azan / Dabiq Terrorist Magazines
- . Terrorist / Govt Intel Alert
- .Terrorist / Govt Intel Background reports and Info
- .Terrorist / Govt Intel News
- Green Dam
- Kvlin

remaining subjects for your subscription 99

**Global 100**

Activated subjects 19

Remaining subjects for your subscription 81

**Organization 10**

Activated Search terms 0

Remaining search terms for your subscription 10

# Hackers, Hacktivists = Cyber Terrorists?

- [-] Hackers / Hacktivists Groups
  - [+] .ANONYMOUS ACTIONS
  - [+] .Cybercrime / Criminal Gangs
  - 4chan
  - 8chan
  - A99
  - Activists - Disrupt Dirty Power Action
  - Activists - background information and reports
  - Afghan Cyber Army
  - Ag3nt47
  - Ajan Turkish Hacker
  - Ajax Security Team / Operation Saffron (Iranian hacker group)
  - Al-Qaeda Electronic Army
  - AnonGhost
  - Antisec / Anti-Sec Movement
  - BlackKatSec
  - China Blue Army
  - Conspiracy Cells of Fire - CCF
  - CyberBerkut /cyber berkut - Ukrainian hacktivistsUkrainian
  - European Cyber Army / AntiSec / ECA\_Legion
  - Evil - Australia
  - Free Syrian Hacker Group / Dr.SHA6H
  - Ghost Shell / Ghostshell/TeamGhostShell
  - Global Islamic Media Front
  - Goatse Security
  - Hacker groups / Hacktivists - Various
  - Hidden Lynx
  - HighTech Brazil HackTeam / hack team
  - Iranian Cyber Army
  - Islamic Cyber Resistance (ICR)
  - Islamic State Hacking Division (ISHD)
  - IsraeliElite / OptIslam
  - Kdms Team aka Anonymous Palestina

# Hackers, Hacktivists = Cyber Terrorists?

← <https://brica.de/alerts/folders/list/>

Più visitati

- IsraeliElite / Oplslam
- Kdms Team aka Anonymous Palestina**
- Lizard Squad
- LulzSec Hacking group
- Malicious Security - Malsec
- NullCrew
- Parastoo
- Peoples Liberation Front (PLF)**
- RedHack
- Rex Mundi
- SSNDOB
- Sandworm
- SiR Abdou / LiBERTADoReS TeaM
- Soupnazi
- Svrian Electronic Army (SEA)**
- Team Poison
- TeamBerserk
- The Hackers Army (Pakistan)**
- The Pakistan Cyber Army**
- Tunisian Cyber Army / Tunesian Cyber Army**
- UGNazi
- Whois Team
- Wiki Boat Brazil
- Wikileaks
- Yemen Cyber Army**
- Z Company Hacking Crew / ZHC
- guccifer
- n0-N4m3 Cr3w
- Human Health Threats (2)**
- Industrial Espionage

# Funding: «Cyber Hawala?»

You probably know about “HAWALA”

Hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers



# *Learning from terrorism financial models*

Many of electronic payment systems are following the HAWALA principle  
And built on the top of similar infrastructure

Now backed by digital infrastructure



No traces in banking network

Money disappear in one place, pop up in another

# *Underground currencies*

Lets look at some examples



There is more than one way to transfer money

# Digital currencies

✦ Don't think just about **bitcoins**!



Bitcoin

File Settings Help

Send Coins Address Book

Your Bitcoin Address: 1AQj7T8L9CHnk7YK6pVPwEkFFvKhCuF9tv

Balance: 55.00

All Transactions		Sent/Received	Sent	Received
Status	Date	Description	Debit	Credit
7 confirmations	19.8.2010 12:03	To: Alice 129ot3TMyQvmncynzCatFagxdK2XAxFcs	-45.00	
7 confirmations	19.8.2010 12:08	Received with: 15S9qMwCwZTZ... (Your Address)		+100.00

13 connections 75108 blocks 2 transactions



# “Underground” currencies

## Getting to know “Underground” money systems

- WMZ - web money - one wmoz = one USD
- Drop - money mule
- CC - creditcards
- Abuse resistant - Safe to host any kind of fraudulent service
- Partnerka - partnership program

WMR – эквивалент RUB  
WMZ – эквивалент USD  
WME – эквивалент EUR  
WMU – эквивалент UAH  
WMB – эквивалент BYR  
WMY – эквивалент UZS  
WMO – эквивалент IGG

# “Underground” currencies

There are many:

- Web Money (WMZ)
- Yandex Money
- LR (liberty reserve)
- Epassporte (dead!)

Where is webmoney office in Thailand?

<a href="#">Webmoney Gate Czech</a>	Прага	Чехия
<a href="#">Webmoney в Брянске</a>	Брянск	Россия
<a href="#">WebMoney Club</a>	Орел	Россия
<a href="#">WmPerm.RU</a>	Пермь	Россия
<a href="#">wmTrader.BIZ</a>	ОМСК	Россия
<a href="#">WMCashing</a>	Санкт-Петербург	Россия
<a href="#">WebMoney центр в Великобритании</a>	Нортхэмптон	Великобритания
<a href="#">oWMT.ru - Генеральный дилер Webmoney Transfer</a>	ОМСК	Россия
<a href="#">Webmoney.kg</a>	Бишкек	Кыргызстан
<a href="#">WMT-Tula, сервис WebMoney в г. Тула</a>	Тула	Россия
<a href="#">Moscow Transfer</a>	Москва	Россия
<a href="#">WMZ.lv</a>	Рига	Латвия
<a href="#">Webmoney Israel</a>	Хадера	Израиль
<a href="#">WebMoney Exchange Point, Pattaya, Thailand</a>	Патайя	Тайланд
<a href="#">Финансовый центр Ростовский обмен</a>	Pataya!! Where gangsters are ;-)	
<a href="#">Webmoney24</a>	Санкт-Петербург	Россия
<a href="#">Обменный пункт Webmoney в Екатеринбурге</a>	Екатеринбург	Россия
<a href="#">E-money - электронные деньги в Кыргызстане</a>	Бишкек	Кыргызстан

# *“Underground” currencies*

Credit card “dumps” websites, work only with “trusted” systems. Why?



AlertPay, SMS, LiqPay

# *“Underground” currencies*

They feature “awesome” geographical locations

[Liberty Reserve – largest payment processor and money transfer ...](#)   .

[www.libertyreserve.com/](http://www.libertyreserve.com/) - 頁庫存檔

Oldest, safest and most popular payment processor operating in **Costa Rica** and serving millions all around a world. Store your funds privately in gold, Euro or ...

# “Underground” currencies

As with real currency, exchange points exist. Percent charged:

## Мониторинг обменных пунктов Magnetic Money

Выгодный обмен валюты  
RBK Money, MoneyMail, Perfect Money, LiqPay, EasyPay, PayPal, Z-Payment.

Главная | Обменники | Статьи

Выберите направление обмена

WMZ

[Показать все](#) [Убрать](#)

Обменник	Отдаст
Speed-Exchange	1 WMZ
cash4wm	1 WMZ

**Внимание!** Автоматический обмен WMZ на LiqPay USD запрещен платежной системой WebMoney. Обменять WMZ на LiqPay USD можно только вручную (т.е. для этого нужно будет связаться с оператором).

**Уведомление о рисках.** При обмене WMZ на LiqPay USD, Вы автоматически соглашаетесь с условиями обмена.

- 1) Вы осведомлены о том, что обмен WMZ на LiqPay USD запрещен платежной системой WebMoney.
- 2) Вы осведомлены о том, что обмен WMZ на LiqPay USD может быть в любой момент заблокирован.

## Список обменных пунктов Magnetic Money

PayPal (USD)  
PayPal (EUR)  
Liberty Reserve (USD)  
Liberty Reserve (EUR)  
Liberty Reserve (Gold)  
MoneyMail (RUR)  
MoneyMail (USD)  
MoneyMail (EUR)  
Perfect Money (USD)  
Perfect Money (EUR)  
Perfect Money (Gold)  
LiqPay (RUR)  
**LiqPay (USD)**  
LiqPay (UAH)  
LiqPay (EUR)  
Moneybookers  
AlertPay (USD)  
C-Gold (USD)  
Pecunix  
EasyPay  
Mobile Wallet (RUR)  
SMS  
Global Digital Pay (USD)  
Global Digital Pay (EUR)

Интернет-банкинг  
Альфа Банк  
Телебанк ВТБ24  
Промсвязьбанк  
Приват 24 (USD)  
Приват 24 (UAH)  
Visa/MasterCard (USD)  
Visa/MasterCard (RUR)  
Visa/MasterCard (UAH)  
Visa/MasterCard (EUR)  
Wire Transfer (RUR)  
Wire Transfer (USD)

Контакты

Найти лучший курс!

Рассчитать

Резерв	BL	Отзывы
10.55	-	2 / 0
606.85	1368	5 / 0

Динамика курса обмена:  
WMZ > LiqPay USD

# ***The scenario(s) and the Actors***

# Crime -> Today

*You got the **information**, you got the **power**..*

Simply put, this happens because the “*information*” can be **transformed at once** into “something else”:

1. **Competitive advantage (geo/political, business, personal relationships)**
2. **Sensible/critical information (blackmailing, extortion)**
3. **Money (Cash-out techniques, Black Market & Underground Economy)**

\* ... **that's why** all of us we want to “*be secure*”.

\* It's not by chance that it's named “IS”: **Information Security** 😊

\* The **trend** of the «*cyber-prefix*» is from **very recent years**, tough.

# Cybercrime

## ❑ Cybercrime:

*“The use of IT tools and telecommunication networks in order to **commit crimes in different manners**”.*

## ❑ The axiom of the whole model:

*“acquiring different types of **data** (information), which can be transformed into **an advantage**.”*

## ❑ Key points:

- **Virtual** (pyramidal approach, anonymity, C&C, flexible and scalable, moving quickly and rebuilding fast, use of “cross” products and services in different scenarios and different business models)
- **Transnational**
- Multi-market (**buyers**)
- **Differentiating** products and services
- **Low** “entry-fee”
- **ROI** /Return of Investment (on each single operation, which means that, exponentially, it can be industrialized)
- Tax & (cyber) Law **heaven**

# Why?

**«Cybercrime ranks as one of the top four economic crimes»**

*PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLC  
Global Economic Crime  
Survey 2011*

*“2013 Cybercrime financial turnover apparently scored up more than Drugs dealing, Human Trafficking and Weapons Trafficking turnovers”*

Various sources (UN, USDOJ, INTERPOL, 2013)


*Financial Turnover, estimation: 12-18 BLN USD\$/year*



# From Cybercrime to...

- We are speaking about an ecosystem **which is very often underevaluated**: most of times, Cybercrime is the **starting** or **transit point** towards different ecosystems:
  - **Information Warfare**
  - **Black Ops**
  - **Cyber Espionage**
  - Hacktivism
  - (private) **Cyber Armies**
  - **Cyber Terrorism (?)**
  - **Underground Economy and Black Markets**
    - Organized Crime
    - Carders
    - Botnet owners
    - 0days
    - Malware factories (APTs, code writing outsourcing)
    - Lonely wolves
    - “cyber”-Mercenaries

# Cybercrime MO



# ***Profiling Actors***


# New Actors joined in

✧ **Cybercrime and Information Warfare** have a **very wide spectrum of action** and use **intrusion techniques** which are nowadays, somehow, available to a **growing amount of Actors**, which use them in order to **accomplish different goals**, with **approaches and intensity** which may deeply vary.

✧ **All of the above is launched against any kind of targets:** Critical Infrastructures, Governative Systems, Military Systems, Private Companies of any kind, Banks, Medias, Interest Groups, Private Citizens....

- ✧ National States
- ✧ IC / LEAs
- ✧ Organized Cybercrime
- ✧ Hacktivists
- ✧ Industrial Spies
- ✧ **Terrorists**
- ✧ Corporations
- ✧ Cyber Mercenaries

**Everyone against everybody**



# Welcome to HPP!



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
advancing security, serving justice,  
building peace



# HACKERS PROFILING PROJECT


# HPP V1.0

- ✦ Back in **2004** we launched the Hacker's Profiling Project - HPP:  
[http://www.unicri.it/special\\_topics/cyber\\_threats/](http://www.unicri.it/special_topics/cyber_threats/)
- ✦ Since that year:
  - ✦ **+1.200** questionnaires collected & analyzed
  - ✦ **9 Hackers profiles** emerged
  - ✦ **Two books** (one in English)
    - ✦ Profilo Hacker, Apogeo, 2007
    - ✦ Profiling Hackers: the Science of Criminal Profiling as Applied to the World of Hacking, Taylor&Francis Group, CRC Press (2009)





OFFENDER ID	LONE / GROUP HACKER	TARGET	MOTIVATIONS / PURPOSES
Wanna Be Lamer 9-16 years "I would like to be a hacker, but I can't"	GROUP	End-User	For fashion, It's "cool" => to boast and brag
Script Kiddie 10-18 years The script boy	GROUP: but they act alone	SME / Specific security flaws	To give vent of their anger / attract mass-media attention
Cracker 17-30 years The destructor, burned ground	LONE	Business company	To demonstrate their power / attract mass-media attention
Ethical Hacker 15-50 years The "ethical" hacker's world	LONE / GROUP (only for fun)	Vendor / Technology	For curiosity (to learn) and altruistic purposes
Quiet, Paranoid, Skilled Hacker 16-40 years The very specialized and paranoid attacker	LONE	On necessity	For curiosity (to learn) => egoistic purposes
Cyber-Warrior 18-50 years The soldier, hacking for money	LONE	"Symbol" business company / End-User	For profit
Industrial Spy 22-45 years Industrial espionage	LONE	Business company / Corporation	For profit
Government Agent 25-45 years CIA, Mossad, FBI, etc.	LONE / GROUP	Government / Suspected Terrorist/ Strategic company/ Individual	Espionage/ Counter-espionage Vulnerability test Activity-monitoring
Military Hacker 25-45 years	LONE / GROUP	Government / Strategic company	Monitoring / controlling / crashing systems





PROFILE	MAY BE LINKED TO	WILL CHANGE ITS BEHAVIOR?	TARGET	(NEW) MOTIVATIONS & PURPOSES
Wanna Be Lamer		No		
Script Kiddie	Urban hacks	No	Wireless Networks, Internet Café, neighborhood, etc..	
Cracker	Phishing Spam Black ops	Yes	Companies, associations, whatever	Money, Fame, Politics, Religion, etc...
Ethical Hacker	Black ops	Probably	Competitors (Telecom Italia Affair), end-users	Big money
Quiet, Paranoid, Skilled Hacker	Black ops	Yes	High-level targets	Hesoteric request (i.e., hack "Thuraya" for us)
Cyber-Warrior	CNIs attacks Gov. attacks	Yes	"Symbols": from Dali Lama to UN, passing through CNIs and business companies	Intelligence ?
Industrial Spy		Yes	Business company / Corporation	For profit
Government Agent		Probably	Government / Suspected Terrorist/ Strategic company/ Individual	Espionage/ Counter-espionage Vulnerability test Activity-monitoring
Military Hacker		Probably	Government / Strategic company	Monitoring / controlling / crashing systems



# HPP V2.0: what happened?

- \* VERY simple:
- \* **Lack of funding:** for phases 3&4 we need support!
  - \* HW, SW, Analysts, Translators
- \* We started back in **2004**: «romantic hackers», + we foreseen those «new» actors tough: **.GOV, .MIL, Intelligence.**
- \* **We missed out:**
  - \* Hacktivism (!);
  - \* Cybercriminals out of the «hobbystic» approach;
  - \* OC;
  - \* The financial aspects (Follow the Money!!);
  - \* **Cyberterrorists** (do they really exist?)




**unicri**

advancing security, serving justice,  
building peace

# Making "Cyber War" ...

- equipment to mimic target network
- dummy run on similar network
- sandbox zerodays

- „dummy list“ of „ID-10T“ for phishing
- background info on organisation (orgchart etc.)
- Primer for sector-specific social-engineering
- proxy servers
- banking arrangements
- purchase attack-kits
- rent botnets
- find (trade!) good C&C server



- Intelligence/Logistics
- Live/System Discovery
- Detailed Preparations
- Testing & Practice
- Attack Execution

- purchase 0-days / certificates
- purchase skill-set
- bespoke payload / search terms

- Purchase L2/L3 system data

Alexander Klimburg 2012

# «Attack attribution»

*„The greatest challenge is finding out who is actually launching the attack“.*

*Major General Keith B. Alexander,  
Commander US CYBERCOM / NSA, testimony May 8<sup>th</sup> 2009,  
„Cyberspace as a Warfighting Domain” – US Congress*

*„Attribution is not really an issue“.  
Senior DoD official, 2012 Aspen Strategy Group*

## Attribution:

- ✓ tactical level = irrelevant
- ✓ operational level = helpful
- ✓ strategic level = important
- ✓ political (board) level = critical



Source: Alexander Klimburg, 2012

# Mistyping may lead to (very) different scenarios...

## Non-state proxies and “inadvertent Cyberwar”:

„ During a time of international crisis, a [presumed non-state CNE] proxy network of country A is used to wage a „serious (malicious destruction) cyber-attack“ against country B.“


**How does country B know if:**

- a) The attack is conducted with consent of Country A (**Cyberwar**)
- b) The attack is conducted by the proxy network itself without consent of Country A (**Cyberterrorism**)
- c) The attack is conducted by a Country C who has hijacked the proxy network? (**False Flag Cyberwar**)

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***What if....***

# The Scenario



# IT and ICT attacks... (currently available!)

## ... WHICH COULD BE USED BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

- \* Giving all what we said, it's definitely **clear and easy to understand** how much **IT and ICT based attacks** may impact on a Nation State.
- \* During our research studies we encountered many **different, concrete evidences** of already-existing **knowledge**, developed by **Security Researchers** and **Ethical Hackers**.
- \* As you have seen during my presentation, we have decided **not to focus** yet on those extremely technical details, while instead providing a first, **big picture** and general view on the **Cyber Terrorism topic**.
- \* Nevertheless, we want to **point out some of those apparently niche knowledge** we have scouted, studied and analyzed, thus applying them to a **possible, global attack on a target country**, which **terrorists may already carry on now**, since the **needed information are, more or less, publicly available**.

# What's at stake?

Among all of our findings and **theoretical attack scenarios**, we focused on the following ones:

- ✖ **SCADA and Industrial Automation.**
- ✖ **Finance Sector: ATMs**
- ✖ **Transportation, Avionics: ADS-B and ACARS**
- ✖ **Transportation, Marine: AIS.**
- ✖ **Transportation, Automotive.**
- ✖ **Transportation, Highways, Railways.**
- ✖ **Public Safety: IP-based CCTVs.**
- ✖ **Personal Privacy: Smart TVs.**
- ✖ Much more could be add to this selection, giving the fact that actual and emerging technologies, as a matter of fact, do not came with the so-called “**Security by Design**” approach, which brings an **amazing amount of vulnerabilities**, which do impact, in a **domino effect**, to **different environments**, allowing **never-seen before attack scenarios**.



# Aircraft Security

✧ The (ethical) hacking community discovered this long time ago

✧ Hugo Teso (DE) – we'll see on next slides

✧ Renderman (CA)

✧ Ruben Santamarta (ES)

✧ Myself (IT)

✧ More security researchers



+



=




**Hackers +  
Airplanes**  
No Good Can Come Of This

Confidence 2012  
Brad "RenderMan" Haines, CISSP  
[www.renderlab.net](http://www.renderlab.net)  
[render@renderlab.net](mailto:render@renderlab.net)  
Twitter: @lhackedWhat

# Air Traffic Control Security

- Back in **2013**, I was attending a presentation at **Hack in the Box** in Amsterdam by Hugo Teso



# Air Traffic Control Security

## Attack Overview

### DISCOVERY:

- » ADS-B

### INFO GATHERING:


- » ACARS

### EXPLOITATION:

- » Via ACARS
- » Against on-board systems vulns.

### POST-EXPLOITATION:


- » Party hard!



# Air Traffic Control Security (ADS-B)

## ADS-B 101

- ✈ Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
- ✈ Radar substitute
- ✈ *Position, velocity, identification, and other ATC/ATM-related information.*
- ✈ ADS-B has a data rate of 1 Mbit/sec.
- ✈ Used for locating and plotting targets



## ADS-B Security

- ✈ None at all
- ✈ Attacks range from **passive attacks** (eavesdropping) to **active attacks** (message jamming, replaying, injection).
- ✈ Target selection
  - » Public Data
  - » Local data (SDR\*)
  - » Virtual Aircrafts



# Air Traffic Control Security (ACARS)

## ACARS 101

- Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
- Digital datalink for **transmission of messages between aircraft and ground stations**
- Multiple data can be sent from the ground to the A/C \*
- Used for passive “OS fingerprinting” and plotting targets

## ACARS Security

- None at all
  - » sometimes monoalphabetic ciphers
- Detailed flight and Aircraft information
  - » Public DB
  - » Local data (SDR)
  - » Virtual Aircrafts
- Ground Service Providers
  - » Two main players
  - » Worldwide coverage

# Air Traffic Control Security (FMS)

## FMS 101



The image displays a Flight Management System (FMS) interface and hardware. On the left, a cockpit display shows various parameters: SPD (259), LNAV, VNAV, PTH, and a central CMD display. Below this is a physical FMS unit. On the right, a Control Display Unit (CDU) shows the 'ACT RTE LEGS' screen with the following data:

LEG	Distance	Altitude
DEP R04	302.0 NM	311 / FL290
R04	7.0 NM	311 / FL318
LOBES	33.7 NM	269 / FL330
COPEL		216 / FL330
HOLD AT COPEL		
BYR00	20.4 NM	269 / FL330

The CDU also features a keyboard with function keys (RTE, CLB, CRZ, DES, DEP ARR, HOLD, PROG, EXEC, FIX, A-E, F-J, K-O, P-T, U-Y, Z, DEL, CLR) and a numeric keypad.

- ✈ Flight Management System typically consists of two units:
  - » A computer unit
  - » A control display unit
- ✈ Control Display Unit (CDU or MCDU) provides the primary human/machine interface for data entry and information display.
- ✈ FMS provides:
  - » Navigation
  - » Flight planning
  - » Trajectory prediction
  - » Performance computations
  - » Guidance

# Air Traffic Control Security (FMS)

## FMS

- ✈ Goal: Exploit the FMS
  - » Using ACARS to upload FMS data
  - » Many different data types available
- ✈ Upload options:
  - » Software Defined Radio
  - » Ground Service Providers
- ✈ The path to the exploit:
  - » Audit aircraft code searching for vulnerabilities
- ✈ We use a lab with virtual airplanes
  - » but real aircraft code and HW



# Air Traffic Control Security (FMS)



## Aircraft Hardware and Software

- ✈ The good old...
  - » eBay!!
- ✈ Russian scrapings
  - » You name it
- ✈ Loving salesman
  - » Value-added products
- ✈ Third party vendors
  - » /wp-admin... Sigh
- ✈ Resentful users or former employees

# Air Traffic Control Security (FMS)

Honeywell offers tools using actual aircraft FMS code...for your genuine training experience

Honeywell's PC-FMS™ free play software provides simulation based on actual flight code software.

THALES

The PC-Primus Apex familiarization tool provides a detailed presentation of the FMS and display windows. High-resolution graphics are combined with actual aircraft code to create a training environment that looks just like the aircraft.

Honeywell

A truly effective

Rockwell Collins FMS desktop trainer (DTT). Our solution uses the same software that is used by the actual Rockwell Collins FMS and display avionics software.

Rockwell Collins

Building trust every day

Online ACARS Aircraft Management

Item condition: **Used**  
Time left: 3d 12h (Mar 02, 2012 19:42:20)  
Bid history: 0 bids

Starting bid: **US \$9.99** !!!!!!!  
Your max bid: US \$  
(Enter US \$9.99 or more)

Bill Me Later: \$5 back and 6 mos to pay on fol pur  
Subject to credit approval. See terms.

Shipping: Read item description or contact  
See all details  
Delivery: Varies

15% OFF

AS Air Land Systems SA-300

Item condition: **Used**

Was: ~~US \$99.95~~


You save: **\$14.99 (15%)**

Price: **US \$84.96**

Honeywell's CMUs and ATSU AOC products are supported by a ground based tool called Airsim. The Airsim tool is a PC-based program that is designed to simulate a datalink system. The Airsim incorporates over 95% of the actual CMU and ATSU AOC software. This allows it


# World Economic Forum

Figure 38: Technological Risks



# World Economic Forum

Figure 17: The Dark Side of Connectivity Constellation



**Origin Risk**  
Increasing capabilities for cyber crime and attacks.


**Pathways**  
Balance-of-power tips as new actors can wage effective interference and disrupt commerce.

**Manifestation**  
The traditional system of global governance is undermined.

Source: World Economic Forum

# World Economic Forum

Figure 41: Framework for Cyber Threats and Responses



Source: World Economic Forum

# Hackmageddon

- \* We think it is clear enough how the industry, manufacturers and system integrators, as well as Governments and Policy Makers, must **immediately take actions in order to avoid that** different, unconventional and unexpected scenarios **became a reality**.
- \* Giving all the above, we may draw a final, **overall scenario**, on which the following attacks may be carried out by single or multiple **terrorist organizations**, acting both individually or in a **coordinated and concerted attack plan**.

# This must not happen. Ever.

- \* **6AM, Monday:** massive fire in the national oil and gas platforms all over the Country X coast. The incident is suspected to be the result of malfunction in the control systems of platforms.
- \* **8AM, Monday:** the late rescue operations suffer from big chaos and lack of coordination, as a result of unexpected breakdowns in the communication networks belonging to the security forces and civil defense.
- \* **8PM, Monday:** hot news appears on the prime time news at national and international TV channels. The collision of two air planes over the international airport at Country X capital looks like the result of a sophisticated Air Traffic Control cyberattack launched against the communications between the two involved planes and the flight control tower of the airport itself. The initial reports were speaking about an “unknown jamming source” on the radar and navigation systems of the international airport.

# This must not happen. Ever.

- \* **On Tuesday morning**, all ATM machines are out of service in various areas of the country, due to the collapse of the internal networks and the main servers of Country X banks. Cybersecurity experts say that the ATMs were infected with a tailored worm, which disabled all of ATM's functionalities.
- \* **Later in the afternoon**, random ATMs were reported to throw out cash, in the form of 10, 20, 50 and 100 Country X local currency (bills). Riots were reported in different areas of the involved cities, as well as urban guerrillas between Law Enforcement Officers and citizens.
- \* **On Tuesday afternoon**, all of CCTV cameras installed in the capital city went out of order: Law Enforcement Agencies cannot monitor anymore the situation in the streets and public safety is at risk.

# This must not happen. Ever.

- \* **On Tuesday night**, the navigation control infrastructure for ships ran by the Navy Control Authority reported multiple problems, ranging from ships suddenly disappearing from the radars to hi-jacked position of known ships, and unknown ships popping up on the radars themselves. Civilian and Military naval control systems literally went blind and can't be considered reliable anymore.
- \* **On Wednesday**, cut off of all communications means in the country, especially the cellular and fixed telephone networks; the news are confirmed, Country X is under a massive, violent cyberattack, for which the terrorist organization "ABC" claimed to be responsible, and the cyber group "Souls of Allah" the executors. All of the vital sectors of Country X can't be considered reliable, and citizens are asked to not leave their homes. Schools and Universities, as well as Public Offices, have been closed for security reasons.
- \* **On Thursday**, multiple citizens suffered apparently poisoning from public water and needed urgent medical help. The hospital of main cities of Country X reported more than 3000 injured people. Security experts reported SCADA attacks to the Water Systems of five different cities.

# This must not happen. Ever.

- \* **7PM, Saturday:** the whole country is without electrical energy. Massive and distributed cyberattacks to the National Electric Grid have been reported. The national energy company can't grant anymore the delivery of electricity for most than 75% of the whole country; electricity power groups and UPS systems will end their self-power capacity by 3 to 6 hours.
- \* **5AM, Sunday:** more than 30.000 soldiers from the terrorist group "ABC" invaded Country X. Disorders, murders, violence and rapes are reported in all of the main cities and small towns of the country. The Prime Minister has been assassinated and the Parliament has been assaulted; right now the military forces are fighting battles with the terrorist troops in many district of the capital; robberies rise up and the situation is close to a state of Civil War. National security is not granted anymore and the overall stability of Country X is at risk. Citizens are escaping from the country, crossing borders by all possible means and entering in Country B and Country C as "war refugees".

# Conclusions

- **Everything has changed.** We are sitting on a **fully unstable chair**. This field of research is **totally new to everyone**. Too much stuff is just **too much underevaluated** here.
- The technologies and environments we are speaking about, which automatically lead to different types of combined, **asymmetric Cyber Attacks**, if **designed and weaponized into a single, distributed attack framework**, would cause significant impacts, disruptions and public panic in a given **target country**.
- What we are speaking about it's not **Hollywood**, while definitely it could lead to 1982 **Wargames movie** and that famous «Global Termo Nuclear War»
- **Critical Infrastructures** play a **critical role** here.
- Ask for technical solutions from the Security Industry, be compliant with security standards and regulations, but **don't forget both taking from and giving back to the security communities**.

# Contacts, Q&A

\* **Need** anything, got **doubts**, wanna **ask me smth?**

\* rc [at] security-brokers [dot] com

\* Pub key: [http://www.security-brokers.com/keys/rc\\_pub.asc](http://www.security-brokers.com/keys/rc_pub.asc)

**Thanks for your attention!**

**QUESTIONS?**

